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Abstract 
In this paper, we consider a hierarchical model of environmental regulation and enforcement 
to study the standard setting decision made by a national regulator and the monitoring 
decision made by a local enforcement agency. The problem is interesting due to differences in 
both available information and objectives at local and national levels. Generally, the national 
regulator is less informed than the local agency about the characteristics of the polluting 
agents. This leads to the use of uniform standards and the delegation of the enforcement 
activity to the local agency. On the one hand, the local agency partially corrects for the 
inefficiency caused by uniform standards by setting a differentiated inspection strategy. On 
the other hand, the level of the standard is distorted to partially correct for the inefficiency 
caused by the divergence between national and local objectives. The interactions between 
local and national decisions are influenced by the size of the divergence in objectives and the 
level of environmental damages. 
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JEL codes: K42, L51, Q58. 
 2
I. Introduction 
The organization of environmental monitoring and enforcement is often vertically structured 
with enforcing authorities at local, regional and national levels. The overview of the structure 
of environmental inspections in EU member states clearly demonstrates this (IMPEL 2006). 
For instance, in Denmark the Ministry of Environment establishes the legal framework for 
environmental policy, while seven regional environmental centers and 98 municipalities carry 
out environmental inspections and enforcement. Also, in the Netherlands over 500 
organizations, including provinces, municipalities and water boards, have roles and 
responsibilities for environmental monitoring. In Romania, the National Environmental 
Protection Agency coordinates eight regional environmental protection agencies and 42 local 
environmental agencies. Etc.  
Local authorities are often the first – or even the only – party interacting with businesses, such 
as small and medium size enterprises. Over time, these local authorities obtain more reliable 
information on the type of firms and the resources available in their jurisdiction than the 
national authority. This accurate, locally available information is not passed on in detail to the 
national level since reporting requirements are limited and often involve aggregate data. For 
example, Dietz et al. (2003) argue that the Canadian policy to protect cod populations proved 
a failure due to a lack of specific information at the national level, while this information was 
available at the local level. They conclude by stressing the need to collect and model both 
local and aggregated information about resource conditions and to use it in making policy at 
the appropriate scales.1 
While enforcement delegation can (partially) solve information problems, however, it seems 
very likely that policy makers and enforcing authorities pursue different objectives2. For 
example, Mintz (2001) and Kuehn (1996) argue that the interests of state environmental 
enforcers diverge from those of the federal administration because they are more vulnerable 
to pressures from elected officials or interest groups, pleas of economic hardship from 
violators, enforcement budget constraints, and too-close relationships between regulators and 
regulated entities.  
Several scenarios are possible regarding the divergence in objectives. Sometimes, local 
inspection agencies prioritize deterrence over cost-related considerations, and in some 
extreme cases they might even act as strict enforcers. Some evidence indeed points to the 
conclusion that environmental inspection agencies are mainly concerned with deterrence and 
only on a secondary level with the compliance cost burden placed on the regulated industry 
(see Firestone 2002, 2003; Heyes and Kapur, 2009). In other instances, green local agencies 
                                                 
1 The process of a federal government delegating the legal authority to implement and enforce certain federally 
designed policies to states is often termed ‘partial preemption’ (Scheberle 1997; Hedge et al. 1991; Crotty 1987). 
Partial preemption has been used for major environmental, social welfare, occupational safety and other 
programs. One of the motivations for partial preemption mentioned by Welborn (1988) is that states can use 
their more intimate knowledge of the regulated entities and problems to implement more effective and efficient 
programs. This is exactly the context we are considering in the current paper. 
2 The choice of the inspection agency’s objective function has already been subject of debate. Cohen (2000), 
Firestone (2002, 2003) and Heyes and Kapur (2009) provide extensive summaries of the different arguments and 
assumptions made in various studies. 
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are more concerned about environmental damages in the regulated region than the national 
agency. Yet another possibility is to consider that inspection agencies place a larger weight on 
firms’ operating costs than the national regulator does. This implies that inspection agencies 
do not act as strict enforcers, but that they balance environmental considerations with 
economic concerns such as stimulating the local economy. This approach is consistent with 
Harford and Harrington (1991) and Stranlund (2007) who assume that part of the costs that 
the agency takes into account consist of the compliance cost burden on the regulated industry. 
Some supporting evidence is found by Makkai and Braithwaite (1992) in the case of health 
officials inspecting nursing homes in Australia, and Muehlenbachs et al. (2013), in the case of 
inspectors sent to offshore oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. Both empirical studies 
find that influence often takes on more subtle forms of persuasion rather than bribery or 
corruption and can, for instance, be based on inspectors’ past job experience in the private 
sector. 
In this paper, we model a hierarchical structure of environmental regulation to study the 
standard setting decision made by a national regulator and the monitoring decisions made by 
the local enforcement agencies. This issue is clearly relevant due to the differences in both 
information and objectives mentioned above. However, to our knowledge, there are no 
theoretical studies which examine the interaction between environmental standard setting by 
federal states and enforcement activities by regional authorities, while capturing the influence 
of these two distortions.3  
We consider a scenario where a national regulator minimizes all social costs, including 
compliance costs for the industry, environmental damages and enforcement costs. A local 
inspection authority considers all these costs as well, but it places different weights on the 
various components than those placed by the national regulator. Also, we assume that the 
national regulator does not have any information about the firms’ compliance costs at the 
micro level, while the local agency does have perfect information in this respect. This leads 
the national regulator to set a uniform standard within the industry and to delegate the 
enforcement activity to the local inspection agency.  
Our results are twofold. First, we show that the local agency can partially correct for the 
inefficiency caused by the uniform standard by setting a differentiated inspection strategy. 
Interestingly, the agency can select the inspection strategy to induce non-compliance  with the 
standard, if the uniform standard set by the regulator is sufficiently strict and the agency is 
rather concerned about firms’ compliance costs. Second, we find that the national regulator 
sets the standard to correct for the inefficiency caused by the divergence in objectives 
between national and local authorities. For example, if the local agency is very much 
concerned about firms’ compliance costs, inspections will be less frequent, since the 
profitability of firms is more highly valued by the local agency than environmental damages. 
In this context, the national regulator might opt to restrict the standard (even at the expense of 
some degree of compliance) to limit environmental damages. On the other hand, if the local 
                                                 
3 In the empirical literature, one exception is Atlas (2007), who examines whether states shirk enforcement 
responsibilities in their principal-agent relationship with the federal government when implementing a delegated 
environmental program. This study also evaluates determinants of environmental enforcement stringency, 
particularly whether penalties for violations of US hazardous waste policies are lower when imposed by states 
than those imposed by the federal government. 
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agency is mainly concerned about deterrence, inspections will be more frequent, since 
compliance with the rules is more highly valued by the agency than firms’ economic 
performance. Thus the national regulator might then opt to weaken the standard (even at the 
expense of some environmental damage) to limit the regulatory burden for the industry. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the relevant 
related literature. In section 3, we present the model. In section 4, we derive the results and 
discuss some policy implications. We conclude in section 5. All the proofs are available in the 
Appendix. 
 
II. Overview of the relevant literature 
The endogenous determination of standards and monitoring strategies has been previously 
studied in the literature, but not in a hierarchical setting (see, for example, Arguedas 2008). 
Saha and Pool (2000) and Decker (2007) consider hierarchical settings where the federal 
government sets the penalty for non-compliance and the local authority engages in monitoring 
and enforcement, but these authors do not address the information asymmetry concerning 
firm characteristics between local and federal administrations analyzed here. Jones and 
Scotchmer (1990) also take the hierarchical approach, but there the standard is exogenous and 
the local agency focuses only on deterrence, as opposed to the more general objective 
function for the local agency considered here. There, the instrument used by the national 
regulator to influence the agency’s distorted decisions is the size of the budget allocated to the 
agency, while our main points can be made without explicitly restricting the monitoring 
budget. In our paper, the national regulator uses the level of the emission standard to correct 
possible distortions, while the size of the budget is treated exogenously. Decker (2007) also 
considers a hierarchical regulatory structure with exogenous standards. There, the regulator 
responsible for setting the fines is a social costs minimizer while the agency responsible for 
enforcement minimizes the sum of enforcement costs and reputation costs related to failures 
in undertaking proper enforcement efforts.  
Informational asymmetries have also been studied in several settings in the literature on fiscal 
federalism. For instance, Bordignon et al. (2001) investigate the optimal intergovernmental 
redistribution of federally collected tax income over two regional governments, when 
information on regional circumstances, such as the size of the tax base or the market value of 
properties, is not known at the federal level. Also the link between public good provision such 
as environmental quality and fiscal policies has been studied. For instance, Cremer et al. 
(1996) and Bucovetsky et al. (1998) consider asymmetric information by assuming that the 
federal government has no information concerning regional preferences for public goods, 
whereas Raff and Wilson (1997) and Cornes and Silva (2000) study asymmetric information 
between federal and regional governments over the local technology for producing local 
public goods. 
As noted by Cohen (1987), the environmental enforcement problem closely resembles a 
principal-agent problem with moral hazard (see, e.g., Townsend, 1979; Laffont and 
Martimort, 2001). Moral hazard arises since firms (agents) must take some costly, 
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unobservable action to abate emissions, and the contract with the enforcement authority 
(principal) specifies the inspection probability and the penalty for non-compliance, both 
jointly determining the expected amount that firms must pay if caught in violation. Since 
enforcement is costly, the optimal enforcement mechanism may be one in which ex post the 
enforcement authority does not monitor all the firms, but in which ex ante the firm complies 
with the environmental regulation on the basis of the expected detection probability (Cohen, 
1987). 
 
III. Model 
We consider the problem depicted in Figure 1. A national regulator sets a pollution standard, 
denoted by e , and a unit fine for non-compliance, denoted by ݂ (and treated as exogenous in 
this paper4), in a representative region subject to environmental regulation.5 In this region, a 
local authority is responsible for enforcing the pollution standard imposed on a number of 
polluting firms. The local agency sets the probability of inspecting each firm i in the region, 
ip  (where 0 1ip  ) to verify firms’ compliance with the standard.6   
Each firm selects the emissions level ie  and, therefore, whether to comply or not with the 
standard e . In case the firm exceeds the standard and it is discovered by the local agency, 
then the exogenous fine is levied, which is assumed to be linear in the degree of violation:7 
  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
4 The fine is exogenous in our model for two reasons. Firstly, in a context as ours with risk neutral firms, a 
conceptual model in which the emission standard, the fine and the inspection probability are all endogenous 
typically results in multiple equilibria. The basic reason is that the expected fine as such drives firms’ 
compliance decisions, and therefore, there exists an infinite number of combinations of the inspection 
probability and the fine which result in the same level of compliance (but see Arguedas 2008 for an exception 
when the social costs of collecting sanctions are considered). Secondly, selecting the optimal standard (given the 
fine) provides more flexibility to the regulator than selecting the optimal fine (given the standard), since the fine 
can only provide abatement incentives for emission levels above the legal standard, while setting the standard 
can in principle provide abatement incentives for any emission level. 
5 In our setting, the national regulator faces uncertainty with respect to the (marginal) abatement costs. So, 
according to Weitzman (1974), emission standards are the preferred instrument as long as the slope of the 
marginal damage curve is steeper than the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve. By restricting the national 
regulator to select the level of a uniform emission standard, we implicitly assume that the slope of the marginal 
damage function is indeed steeper than that of the marginal abatement cost curve. 
6 For example, in Sweden local environmental agencies can set their own priorities for compliance monitoring, 
but the law does not give them discretion in determining sanctions. The Autonomous Communities in Spain also 
have complete discretion in compliance monitoring, but the monetary sanctions they impose must conform to 
national provisions that define upper and lower limits for administrative penalties for particular types of offenses 
(see Mazur, 2011). 
7 In practice, a linear specification of fines is often encountered for civil fines, since this structure is easy to 
understand by firms, citizens and administrations. Moreover, Arguedas (2008) shows in a theoretical model of 
pollution standards that linear penalties are socially preferred if the regulator is entitled to choose the structure of 
the fine. 
 max 0; , 0.iF f e e f  
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We now discuss the objective functions and decision variables of the firms, the local agency 
and the national regulator in more detail. 
3.1. Firms 
Assume there are ܰ polluting firms in the region. The emission level of firm i is denoted as 
o
i ie e , where  is the emission level without regulation in place. The firm can reduce its 
emissions below the maximum level at a cost which depends on the pollution level ie  and 
on the parameter ߠ௜, which defines the firms’ type. The abatement cost of a firm of type ߠ௜ is 
represented by the function ܿሺߠ௜, ݁௜ሻ, which has the following specification: ܿ௘ሺߠ௜ , ௜݁ሻ < 0 for 
all ݁௜ < ݁௜௢, ܿ௘ሺߠ௜, ݁௜௢ሻ = 0, ܿ௘௘ሺߠ௜, ݁௜ሻ > 0 for all ݁௜ ≤ ௜݁௢. Assume also that the third order 
derivative is negligible.  
For simplicity, we assume there are two firm types: high-cost firms  H  and low-cost firms 
ሺߠ௅ሻ. The number of high-cost (low-cost) firms is NH (NL), such that NH+NL=N. A high-cost 
firm has higher total and marginal abatement costs for each level of emissions than a low-cost 
firm. Thus,    , ,H i L ic e c e   and    , ,e H i e L ic e c e  . Also, we assume  
   , ,ee H i ee L ic e c e  .  
The aggregate level of emissions in the region is 
,
i i
i H L
E N e

  . These emissions cause 
environmental damages equal to  D E  with  ' 0D E   and  " 0D E  . 
The objective of each (risk-neutral) firm type is to choose the pollution level that minimizes 
the sum of abatement costs and expected fines. Therefore, for a given regulatory policy 
ሼ݁̅, ݂, ݌௜ሽ a firm of type i  solves the following problem: 
    min , max 0;
i
i i i ie
c e p f e e     . (1) 
3.2 The local agency 
In the region, the local inspection agency is responsible for enforcing environmental 
regulation. We assume that the local agency has perfect information on the type of each firm, 
but monitoring is still needed to formally document a violation. We assume that the cost per 
inspection is m>0 and that monitoring is perfectly accurate. Also, we assume that the local 
agency can credibly commit to a particular inspection frequency.8 
                                                 
8 For example, inspections might require labor and measuring equipment that need to be purchased and 
deployed. Also, pre-commitment can be justified on reputational grounds, see Garvie and Keeler (1994), 
Stranlund and Dandha (1999) or, more recently, Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2010). However, some 
other authors have considered monitoring strategies in settings where the agency cannot a priori commit to a 
specific monitoring frequency (see, for example, Grieson and Singh, 1990 and Franckx, 2002). 
o
i
e
o
i
e
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The objective of the local inspection agency is to choose inspection probabilities for each firm 
type, ip , taking environmental damages caused by aggregate emissions (  D E ), firms’ 
abatement costs (  ,i i i i
i
N c e ), and monitoring costs ( i i
i
m N p ) into account. As in Keeler 
(1995), we introduce the parameter   to reflect the importance given by the local inspection 
agency to abatement costs in the social cost minimization problem. In particular, if 1  , the 
agency acts as a social costs minimizer and its objective is aligned with that of the national 
regulator, as we will see later on. However, the agency’s objective diverges from the national 
regulator’s objective when 1  . For example, if concerns about firms’ operating costs 
dominate, then  > 1. And if concerns about deterrence dominate, then  < 1. We treat the 
parameter   as exogenous, since it typically depends on a wide variety of non-modelled 
factors such as past interactions with firms, political influence and the general viewpoint of 
the local enforcement agency.  
Therefore, the optimization problem of the inspection agency is the following: 
   min ,
i
i i i i i ip i i
D E N c e m N p     
considering that firms react strategically to the regulatory policy , as explained 
above.9 
3.3 The national regulator 
To protect environmental quality, the national government selects a uniform emission 
standard e  for all the firms in the region. We assume that the national government knows the 
number of firms of each type i, but does not know the exact type of each individual firm due 
to the aggregated and incomplete information flow between government levels. 10  
We assume that the objective of the national government is to choose the emission standard 
that minimizes social costs in the region, i.e., environmental damages, firms’ abatement costs 
and monitoring costs associated with the inspection probability pi selected by the local 
agency. Therefore, the optimization problem of the national regulator is the following: 
                                                 
9 As already pointed out in the introduction, one could alternatively consider a green local agency which is 
mainly concerned about environmental damages; or a local authority mainly concerned about enforcement costs. 
These modelling alternatives would imply to place the parameter  > 1 in front of environmental damages or 
monitoring costs, respectively, in the objective function of the local authority. Fortunately, our results do not 
qualitatively change under these alternative assumptions, but we will specifically comment on the exact 
differences later on in footnotes 13 and 17. 
10 The informational advantage of the local inspection agency is exogenous in this model. More realistic would 
be to assume that the local authority makes probabilistic assessments about the cost structure of the firms based 
on past performance, instead of directly assuming perfect information. However, including such a learning 
structure would complicate matters without adding too much insight into the analysis. An illustration of the 
difficulties found when characterizing the optimal monitoring policy under this learning process in a non-
hierarchical setting can be found in Arguedas and Rousseau (2012).  
 
 , , ie f p
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   min ,i i i i i ie i i
D E N c e m N p    
where firms react strategically to the regulatory policy and the local enforcer authority sets the 
inspection probability, as explained above. 
To summarize, after the standard ݁̅ is set by the national regulator and made public 
knowledge, the agency announces an inspection probability pi for each firm type  ,i H L . 
Then, each firm reacts to the regulatory policy by selecting the pollution level. In the next 
section, we solve this problem backwards in order to find the sub-game perfect equilibrium. 
  
IV. Results 
First we look at firms’ behavior when they are confronted with a uniform emission standard at 
the regional level. Next we derive the optimal inspection strategy for the environmental 
agency conditional on the stringency of the standard. Finally, we investigate the choice of the 
emission standard made by the national government while taking firms’ and local agency’s 
reactions within the region into account. 
4.1 Firms’ behavior 
As explained in the previous section, firms choose their emissions levels so as to minimize 
expected costs, consisting of abatement costs and expected fines for non-compliance, see 
equation (1). The solution of this optimization problem is presented next. 
Lemma 1. Given , firm i’s optimal emission level, ݁̃௜ , is given by the conditions:  
ܿ௘ሺߠ௜, ݁̃௜ሻ + ݌௜݂ ≥ 0, 
݁௜௢ ≥ ݁̃௜ ≥ ݁̅, 
ሾܿ௘ሺߠ௜, ݁̃௜ሻ + ݌௜݂ሿሾ݁̃௜ − ݁̅ሿ = 0. 
  
The intuition of this result is straightforward. Given the policy ሼ݁̅, ݂, ݌௜ሽ, firm i can decide to 
either comply with the standard, or not. The optimal strategy is to comply when the marginal 
expected penalty for non-compliance is larger than the marginal abatement cost savings of 
exceeding the standard; that is, when ݌௜݂ ≥ −ܿ௘ሺߠ௜, ݁̅ሻ. In that case, the optimal strategy is 
ie e .11 However, the optimal strategy is to exceed the standard if the marginal expected 
penalty is below the marginal abatement cost savings at the standard. In that case, the firm 
                                                 
11 In a static model such as ours, the firm never chooses an emission level strictly below the standard: it just 
increases abatement costs, but there are no penalty savings. 
 , , ie f p
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chooses the emission level such that marginal abatement cost savings and marginal expected 
fines are equal. Therefore, ie e  and ܿ௘ሺߠ௜ , ݁̃௜ሻ + ݌௜݂ = 0. 
From Lemma 1, we can define the threshold inspection probability for each firm type, such 
that compliance with the standard is ensured above that threshold, as follows:  
 
 ,e i
i
c e
p
f

   (2) 
Obviously, H Lp p , since    , ,e H i e L ic e c e   for all ie . Thus, i ip p  ensures 
compliance with the standard, i.e., ie e . However, i ip p  ensures that firms of type i 
exceed the standard, i.e., ie e  and ܿ௘ሺߠ௜, ݁̃௜ሻ + ݌௜݂ = 0. This expression defines an implicit 
relationship between the inspection probability and the induced emission level, such that: 
    , 0,,
i
i i
i ee i i
e fe
p c e


   

 (3) 
which represents the effect on emissions of a marginal increase in the inspection probability, 
such that the larger the probability, the lower the emission level. Our assumptions concerning 
the abatement cost function ensure that the impact of the inspection frequency on emissions is 
constant, and that high-cost firms react more than low-cost firms to an increase in the 
probability of inspection (in terms of emission reduction), independently of the emission 
level. That is: 
    , ,H LH H L L
H L
e ee e
p p
    
 
. (4) 
4.2 Local agency behavior 
The local inspection agency knows the specific type of each firm, and is thus able to 
differentiate its monitoring strategy depending on the type. However, monitoring is still 
necessary to formally document a violation so as to allow prosecution and sanctioning. As 
explained in the previous section, the agency’s optimization problem is the following:  
 
   
 
, , ,
min , ,
. . , 0; ; ; , ,
H L
i i i i ip p i H L i H L
o
e i i i i i i
D E N c e m N p
s t c e p f e e e e i H L
 

 
 
    
 
 (5) 
where the constraints represent the firm types’ best responses, as established in Lemma 1. 
The stringency of the emission standard crucially influences the agency’s monitoring options. 
Remember that the local agency has no power to control firm behavior for emission levels 
below the national standard ( e ), but it can induce emission levels above e  through the 
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implicit expression  , 0e i i ic e p f    or, equivalently, through the inspection probability 
 ,e i i
i
c e
p
f

  . Interestingly, this expression is independent of the emission standard due to 
the linear nature of the fine for non-compliance. Substituting this inspection probability into 
the objective function of problem (5) helps us in defining the local agency’s preferred 
emission levels. The agency’s objective function is U-shaped, and the minimum of this 
function ( aie ) is characterized by the first order condition    ,' ,
a
ee i ia
e i i
c e
D c e m
f

    , 
i.e., marginal damages equal the sum of marginal abatement and marginal monitoring costs at 
that emissions level.12 The local agency can induce compliance or non-compliance with the 
emission standard depending on the location of such standard with respect to the local 
agency’s preferred emissions levels aie , as we show next.  
Lemma 2. Given  , the local agency’s optimal inspection strategy  * *,H Lp p  is the following: 
(i)  
 * , ae i i
i
c e
p
f

  ,  if aie e . 
(ii)  * ,e ii i
c e
p p
f
   ,   if aie e . 
Case (i) in Lemma 2 corresponds to the situation where the emission standard is below the 
local agency’s preferred emissions level aie . In this case, the local agency can induce 
a
ie  by 
means of the inspection probability 
 * , ae i i
i
c e
p
f

  . This monitoring strategy results in non-
compliance, since aie e . However, under case (ii) in Lemma 2, the national standard is 
(weakly) above the local agency’s preferred emissions level, aie . Since the local agency 
cannot induce emission levels below the standard, the best the agency can do in this case is to 
induce compliance with the standard by means of the threshold probability  ,e ii
c e
p
f
  .  
Lemma 2 can be illustrated by means of Figure 2. We consider two firm types in the analysis 
and our assumptions ensure that a aL He e . Thus, we can distinguish three cases depending on 
the location of the emission standard with respect to the local agency’s preferred emission 
                                                 
12 If the weight that the local agency attributed to firms’ abatement costs ( ) were sufficiently large, the local 
agency’s objective function could be decreasing in emissions. In this case, the local agency’s preferred emissions 
levels would be the business-as-usual levels ( 0ie ), since an infinitesimal reduction of emissions from those levels  
would result in small marginal damage savings as compared to the corresponding additional marginal abatement 
costs and marginal monitoring costs of that emissions reduction. In that case, the optimal strategy for the local 
agency would be to leave firms uninspected. 
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levels aLe  and 
a
He : a stringent standard (
a
Le e ), a moderate standard ( )
a a
L He e e   and a lax 
standard ( )aHe e . The upper graph shows the relationship between the stringency of the 
standard and the optimal inspection probability. The lower graph shows the resulting firm 
types’ best responses to both the standard and the inspection probability. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 Assume first that the standard is set at a sufficiently stringent level ( aLe e ). In this case, the 
agency can implement its most preferred outcome  ,a aH Le e  by setting the inspection 
probabilities defined in part (i) of Lemma 2. Our assumptions ensure that the probability 
associated with the high-cost firms is larger than the probability associated with the low-cost 
firms. In that range, the required probabilities do not depend on the level of the standard, 
since the fine is linear in the degree of non-compliance and, therefore, the marginal fine is not 
affected by the size of the violation. In that range, both types of firms exceed the national 
standard e , but the size of the violation is smaller for low-cost firms than for high-cost firms, 
since a aL He e . The latter is illustrated in the lower graph of Figure 2, where for the national 
standard below aLe , both types’ induced emissions levels are above the 45º degree line.   
Secondly, if the standard is set at a moderate level ( a aL He e e  ), the agency cannot 
implement its most preferred outcome  ,a aH Le e  since low-cost firms never select a pollution 
level below the standard (see Lemma 1). As a consequence, the best the agency can do in this 
case is to induce low-cost firms to fully comply with the standard (otherwise, the induced 
pollution level would be further away from the agency’s most preferred level) and to induce 
high-cost firms to select the pollution level aHe  above the standard. Thus the inspection 
authority selects a different type of strategy for each firm type:  * ,
a
e H H
H
c e
p
f

    and 
*
L Lp p , where Lp  is the threshold probability given by (2). In this region, the inspection 
probability selected for the high-cost type is independent of the standard since the marginal 
fine is constant and, therefore, unaffected by the level of the standard. However, the threshold 
probability attached to the low-cost type is decreasing in the standard, since the less stringent 
the standard, the less monitoring resources are needed to induce the low-cost firms to comply 
with the standard (see expression (2) and recall that  , 0ee i ic e  ). 
Finally, if the standard is lax ( aHe e ), the local agency cannot implement its most preferred 
outcome  ,a aH Le e  either, and the best the agency can do in this case is to induce both firm 
types to comply with the standard. Then, the optimal inspection strategy involves setting the 
threshold probabilities to induce full compliance ( *H Hp p  and 
*
L Lp p ). High-cost firms 
are inspected more frequently than low-cost firms and both firm types fully comply with the 
standard e . In this region, both threshold inspection probabilities are decreasing in the level 
of the standard, until the level of the standard eventually reaches the business-as-usual 
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outcome (for illustration purposes, this level coincides for both firm types in Figure 2, but this 
need not necessarily be the case). 
As can be seen in Figure 2, the local inspection agency uses its informational advantage and 
treats both firm types differently. Therefore, it lowers the inefficiency of using a uniform 
emission standard to regulate heterogeneous firms in the region. However, the weight that the 
local agency attributes to firms’ abatement costs ( ) creates a distortion in the solution, since 
this weight crucially affects the local agency’s preferred emissions levels, aie . Clearly, the 
larger the weight attributed to firms’ abatement costs, the larger the preferred emissions levels 
and therefore, the more likely the inspection strategy will result in firms’ non-compliance (in 
other words, the larger the stringent and moderate standard regions in Figure 2). The national 
government considers this distortion when it sets the emission standard, as we explain next.13   
4.3 Standard setting by the national regulator 
We now study the standard setting decision at the national level. As mentioned before, the 
regulator aims to minimize all social costs associated with the environmental policy at the 
regional level by selecting the appropriate emission standard while taking into account firms’ 
and the local agency’s reactions to the standard. 
Therefore, the problem the regulator at the national level solves is the following: 
 
   
 
 
, ,
min , ,
,
,
. . ,
,
,
i i i i ie i H L i H L
a
e i i a
i
i
ae i
i
D E N c e m N p
c e
e e
fs t p
c e
e e
f



 
 
 
  
   
    
 
 (6) 
where ( aie ) is the local agency’s preferred emissions levels, implicitly defined by 
   ,' ,
a
ee i ia
e i i
c e
D c e m
f

    , as explained in the previous subsection.   
Firms react to the standard in the way illustrated in Figure 2. If the standard is set below the 
emission level preferred by the inspection agency, ݁̅ ≤ ݁௜௔, the agency designs the inspection 
policy such that the firm ends up polluting ݁௜௔. However, if the standard is set above the 
emission level preferred by the inspection agency, ݁̅ > ݁௜௔, then the agency chooses the 
monitoring probability such that the firm ends up complying with the standard ݁̅. 
                                                 
13 If we alternatively assumed a larger weight on monitoring costs or environmental damages in the local 
authority’s objective function, the exact placement of both ݁௅௔ and ݁ு௔ would surely change, but we would still 
keep the three regions identified in Figure 2, since ݁௅௔ < ݁ு௔. The larger the weight attributed to enforcement 
costs, the larger both ݁௅௔ and ݁ு௔ and, therefore, the more to the right the stringent and moderate standard regions 
in Figure 2. Alternatively, the larger the weight attributed to environmental damages, the lower both ݁௅௔ and ݁ு௔ 
and, therefore, the more to the left the corresponding stringent and moderate standard regions. 
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Consequently, any standard below ݁௅௔ results in the same pollution levels ሺ݁௅௔ , ݁ு௔ሻ with the 
same monitoring resources, since in this case the inspection agency selects the inspection 
probability 
 , ae i i
i
c e
p
f

   , ݅ = ܪ, ܮ, which is independent of e . For this reason the 
national regulator never selects the emission standard in the stringent regulatory region where 
݁̅ < ݁௅௔. 
Therefore, we can restrict our analysis to ݁̅ ≥ ݁௅௔. As a result, low-cost firms always comply 
with the standard, while high-cost firms may or may not comply. Thus we still have two cases 
to examine: the moderate regulatory region (݁̅ < ݁ு௔) and the lax regulatory region (݁̅ ≥ ݁ு௔). 
Intuitively, if marginal monitoring costs relative to marginal damages and marginal abatement 
costs are high, then the national regulator sets a lax standard ݁̅ ≥ ݁ு௔  and both types of firms 
comply with the standard. However, if marginal monitoring costs relative to marginal 
damages and marginal abatement costs are low, then the national regulator sets a moderate 
standard ݁௅௔ ≤ ݁̅ ≤ ݁ு௔  and only low-cost firms comply. Hence, the relationship between 
monitoring costs and induced pollution is the expected one: higher monitoring costs result in 
larger pollution levels and vice versa. However, the results regarding compliance levels seem 
counterintuitive: higher monitoring costs result in higher compliance rates, and vice versa. 
This result comes from the fact that the local inspection agency only induces firms to comply 
as long as the national regulator announces a standard above the agency’s preferred emission 
level ௜݁௔. 
Now, it is useful to define the level of the uniform emission standard that minimizes the 
national regulator’s objective function defined in (6), (naively) assuming that both firm types 
comply with the standard. We denote this level as ue  and it is characterized by the first order 
condition:  
    
,
' , , / 0u ui e i ee i
i H L
N D c e mc e f 

   .      (7) 
Obviously, this emission level can only be implemented as long as the local agency’s 
preferred emission level for the high-cost type aHe is below 
ue . Otherwise, the best the 
national regulator can do is to let the high-cost firms pollute aHe  and induce the low-cost firms 
to comply with a restricted emission standard. This restricted emission standard re  is set such 
that: 
    ' , , / 0r re L ee LD c e mc e f    .       (8) 
Simply comparing (7) and (8), note that r ue e .  
The solution of the national regulator’s problem is then summarized next.  
Proposition 1. The optimal emission standard *e  set by the national regulator is: 
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i) * ,u u aHe e if e e  . 
ii) * ,r u aHe e if e e  . 
Therefore, the optimal emission standard can induce either full compliance of all firms in the 
region (case i) or compliance of the low-cost firms only (case ii). The choice crucially 
depends on the location of ue  with respect to aHe , where 
ue  is the uniform pollution level that 
minimizes the sum of environmental damages, abatement costs and monitoring costs in the 
region, as we have previously characterized in expression (7). Which of the two compliance 
scenarios emerges crucially depends on the value of  , that is, the weight that the local 
agency attributes to abatement costs. This is so because   and  aHe  are positively related: the 
larger  , the larger aHe , and vice versa.  
On the one hand, we can have full compliance of all firms in the region (case i in Proposition 
1) if   is small enough, i.e., if the local agency does not care much about firms’ operating 
costs. The explanation of the result is simple: since the local agency’s preferred pollution 
levels in this case are small and the associated inspection costs to induce compliance with 
those levels are large, the national regulator is tempted to pass a regulation that saves on total 
monitoring costs by relaxing the standard, although at the expense of additional external 
damages. The level of the standard in this case is the one that minimizes the sum of 
environmental damages, firms’ abatement costs and monitoring costs (i.e., the level ݁௨ 
previously characterized in expression (7)), and both firms’ types are induced to comply with 
the standard.14 
On the other hand, we obtain partial compliance, with only low-cost firms complying with the 
standard (case ii in Proposition 1), as long as 1  , i.e., when the local agency cares about 
firms’ operating costs more than the national regulator does. Full compliance is not possible 
in this scenario.15 The local inspection agency less frequently inspects the firms in the region 
since now the profitability (and survival) of local firms is more highly valued than the 
deterioration of the environment. Since total monitoring costs are less of a burden in this 
alternative setting, the national regulator might opt to restrict the standard (and therefore, the 
induced pollution levels) to limit environmental damages in the region. The level of the 
standard in this case minimizes the sum of environmental damages and low-cost firms’ 
abatement and monitoring costs (i.e., it corresponds to the restricted level ݁௥  previously 
                                                 
14 It is interesting to compare this uniform induced emission level ݁௨ with the emissions levels that minimize the 
national regulator’s objective function, i.e., the sum of environmental damages, firms’ abatement costs and 
monitoring costs. We denote these levels by ݁௅∗ and ݁ு∗ , which are characterized by the first order conditions 
ܦᇱ + ܿ௘ሺߠ௜ , ݁௜∗ሻ −
௠௖೐೐൫ఏ೔,௘೔
∗൯
௙
= 0. Our assumptions ensure ݁௅∗ < ݁ு∗ . These ideal pollution levels could be 
implemented only in the case where the national regulator had all the information about each specific firm and 
did not need to delegate enforcement to a better informed authority. Note that ݁௨ is located between these two 
ideal pollution levels, that is, ݁௅∗ < ݁௨ < ݁ு∗ . Thus, in this case, high (low) abatement cost firms are induced to 
pollute less (more) than the corresponding ideal emission levels. 
15 If 1  , the ideal pollution levels defined in footnote 15 are lower than the local agency’s preferred levels, 
i.e., ݁௜∗ < ݁௜௔. In particular, ݁ு∗ < ݁ு௔, which implies ݁௨ < ݁ு௔, that is, case (ii) in Proposition 1.  
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characterized in expression (8)). As a result, low-cost firms comply with the standard ݁௥ , and 
high-cost firms violate the standard and pollute the level a rHe e .16 
Summarizing, the national regulator uses the emission standard to (partially) correct for the 
biased objectives pursued by the local agency. If the local agency does not care much about 
firms’ operating costs, then the standard will be laxer and compliance with that standard will 
be more likely. If, on the other hand, the local agency puts too much emphasis on firms’ 
operating costs, the standard will be stricter and compliance will be less likely.17 
 
V. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analyzed the interactions between the environmental standard setting 
decision by a national regulator and the monitoring decision by a local enforcement agency, 
assuming that authorities at the local and national levels have different available information 
and might pursue different objectives.  
We have considered an extreme scenario where the local agency perfectly knows firms’ 
compliance costs, while the national regulator has imperfect information in this respect. This 
leads the national regulator to set a uniform standard within the industry and to delegate the 
enforcement activity to the local inspection agency. We have found that the local agency can 
partially correct for the inefficiency caused by the uniform standard by setting a differentiated 
inspection strategy. This strategy can induce partial (or even full) non-compliance with the 
standard, if the uniform standard set by the regulator is sufficiently strict and the agency is 
mainly concerned about firms’ abatement costs. Conversely, when the agency mainly focuses 
on deterrence, the uniform standard set by the regulator will be complied more frequently 
than socially desired. Also, we have found that the national regulator can set the standard to 
correct for the inefficiency caused by the divergence in objectives between national and local 
authorities. The national regulator might impose a less stringent standard to save on 
monitoring costs when the local agency and the national regulator’s objectives do not diverge 
much. However, the national regulator might opt to restrict the standard if the local agency is 
more concerned about firms’ regulatory costs or to weaken the standard if the local agency is 
mainly concerned about firms’ compliance or about environmental quality.   
Thus, by looking at both the environmental policy instrument and the associated monitoring 
strategy, we have found that the efficiency disadvantage of uniform emission standards is 
substantially alleviated by the agency’s inspection policy. Hence the disadvantage of uniform 
regulatory standards may be overstated in the literature. Important conditions for this 
                                                 
16 Therefore, in this case, low abatement cost firms are induced to pollute an emission level ݁௥which might be 
very close to the corresponding ideal level ݁௅∗ (in fact, these two levels coincide under constant marginal 
environmental damages), while high abatement cost firms are induced to pollute above the corresponding ideal 
pollution level, defined in footnote 14.    
17 The same sort of conclusion can be found if we alternatively assumed that the local agency placed a larger 
weight than the national authority on monitoring costs or a lower weight than the national authority on 
environmental damages. In both cases, the national regulator would set a stricter standard and compliance would 
be less likely. 
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improvement in the efficiency of the environmental policy are the availability of sufficient 
resources for the inspection agency and the incorporation of abatement cost considerations in 
the agency’s objective function. Therefore, it might be desirable to influence the form of the 
agency’s objective function by increasing the weight attached to firms’ compliance costs. 
This could be done, for example, by changing the agency’s mission statement combined with 
independent, external evaluation of the agency’s performance.   
In this paper, we have implicitly considered that collected fines (if any) are redistributed 
lump-sum in the society. This explains why the specific fine structure is not present in the 
national regulator’s objective function. In fact, fines do not appear in the local agency’s 
objective function either, but we could have considered an alternative scenario in which the 
local agency placed a different weight on the total expected costs faced by the firms than the 
national regulator. These expected costs would not only include abatement costs but also 
possible fines for non-compliance. In the event that the local agency cared more than the 
national regulator about firms’ total expected costs, then the local agency could implicitly 
“relax” the national standard in cases where such standard induced non-compliance by a 
particular firm type, and set it equal to the corresponding local agency’s preferred emission 
level. Since the fine is linear in the degree of non-compliance, this implicit increase in the 
standard would not imply any change in the optimal inspection probability, and the resulting 
induced emission level would not change either (note that the induced emission level of a 
particular firm type is equal to the local agency’s desired level even when the national 
standard is set below such locally desired emission level, see Figure 2). From the point of 
view of the national regulator, this manipulation of the standard by the local regulator would 
not have any consequences on the level of social costs18. In fact, the national regulator does 
not care about whether fines are actually imposed or not, as long as the induced emission 
levels and inspection costs do not change. However, this relaxed standard could obviously 
benefit firms significantly, since firms would be complying with the local standard and would 
not be punished. To hide the implicit relaxation of the standard, the local agency could also 
use warnings and compliance orders as an alternative sanction instead of fines. This implies 
that firms receive an official communication that they were found to be in violation and they 
are ordered to rectify the situation. Warnings and compliance orders are frequently used in 
practice (see, e.g., Rousseau, 2009) as a soft sanctioning instrument: detected violators are 
officially sanctioned, but they face no direct monetary consequences. 
The possibility of locally relaxing the standards or setting warnings instead of fining violators 
is connected with the idea of collusion between the supervisor and the agents. This idea has 
been explored in the literature on monitoring delegation, (see, for example, Tirole, 1986 and 
Strausz, 1997) and in the literature on regulatory capture (see, for example, Makkai and 
Braithwaite, 1992 and Dal Bo, 2006). In our setting, the national regulator delegates the 
responsibility of monitoring to the local agency, and the local agency would be able to 
manipulate the outcome of the inspection if doing so is in its best interest. This effectively 
means that the local agency and the firms would be colluding against the national regulator. 
                                                 
18 In our model we do not attribute social benefits to punishing the guilty or social costs to acquitting the guilty 
(see e.g. Kitai, 2003), since such fairness considerations are not specifically included in the regulator’s objective 
function. 
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In order to empirically validate the theory we have developed, it might be interesting to 
distinguish different groups of countries depending on the degree of delegation of powers 
from the national regulator to local authorities. Mazur (2011) provides an example of such a 
classification depending on the degree of decentralization in countries. Then differences in 
environmental policy regarding instrument choice, stringency, monitoring strategies and 
sanctions might be identified between the groups. Unfortunately, finding empirical indicators 
for environmental policy stringency, monitoring strength and compliance levels is notoriously 
difficult (see, for instance, EAP task force 2006; IMPEL 2008). Thus, it might be equally 
difficult to proof a causal link between a country’s delegation structure and the design of the 
environmental monitoring and enforcement strategy. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1  
The first order conditions of this optimization problem are:19 
 
 
 
, 0,
0, 0, 0,
e i i i
i i
c e p f
e e e e
 
 
  
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where  is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier. Easily combining these conditions, we obtain the 
desired result. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
Since  , 0e i i ic e p f   , the Lagrangian of problem (5) can be written as follows:  
       
, , , ,
,
, ,e i i oi i i i i i i i i
i H L i H L i H L i H L
c e
L D E N c e m N e e e e
f
   
   
             
where 0, 0i i    are the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker multipliers. Thus, everything can be 
reduced to obtain the optimal agency’s induced emissions levels.20 The optimality condition 
for each firm type is then the following: 
   ,' , 0ee i ii i e i i i i
c e
N D N c e m
f
        , ,i H L . 
We concentrate on the case where 0i  .21 On the one hand, the optimality condition for the 
interior solution, where 0i   and  ie e   is the following: 
   ,' , 0ee i ie i i
c e
D c e m
f
    . 
Note that this condition is exactly the one that characterizes the agency’s preferred emissions 
levels, aie . Then, ai ie e e  . These levels can be induced using the implicit expression
 , 0e i i ic e p f    and, therefore, 
 * , ae i i
i
c e
p
f

  . 
                                                 
19 Given the assumptions of our model, these are necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimum. The same 
applies for the other optimization problem in the paper. 
20 These emissions levels can be induced by the corresponding inspection probabilities using the implicit 
expression  , 0e i i ic e p f   . 
21 The case 0i   would imply 
0
i ie e  and 0i  , which could be induced by 0ip  .  
0 
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On the other hand, the corner solution where  0i   and ie e  is obtained when 
   ,' , 0ee ie i c eD c e m f

    . Comparing this above expression with the one that 
characterizes aie ,    
,
' , 0
a
ee i ia
e i i
c e
D c e m
f

    , and using the assumption of convexity 
of the objective function, we then have ai ie e e  . The emissions level in this case, ie e , 
can be induced by the threshold inspection probabilities defined in (2). 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Consider first the case where ݁௨ ≥ ݁ு௔ . The optimization problem is the following: 
   
 
, ,
min , ,
,
. .
i i i i ie i H L i H L
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i
D E N c e m N p
c e
s t p
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 
 
 
 
The first order condition of this problem is: 
∑ ௜ܰ ቄܦᇱ + ܿ௘ሺߠ௜ , ݁̅ሻ − ݉
௖೐೐ሺఏ೔,௘̅ሻ
௙
ቅ = 0௜ , 
 If we alternatively consider the restricted problem where ݁௅௔ ≤ ݁௨ < ݁ு௔, the optimization 
problem is now the following: 
   
   
, ,
min , ,
,,
. . ;
i i i i ie i H L i H L
a
e ie i H
H L
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 
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Now, the first order condition of this problem is simply: 
ܦᇱ + ܿ௘ሺߠ௅ , ݁̅ሻ − ݉
௖೐೐ሺఏಽ,௘̅ሻ
௙
= 0. 
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Figure 1: The regulatory problem 
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Figure 2: Optimal inspection probabilities 
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